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With the decision of the Seventh Circuit in April of 1977 and
the subsequent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court, the final
curtain appears to have been brought down on Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co.' It is the sort of case that Charles Dickens (or perhaps
a less perceptive social critic) would have cherished: 2 seven years
and three reported decisions were required to find that the plaintiffs
had a cause of action,3 and then another seven years and two reported decisions were necessary to determine that the plaintiffs had
suffered no damages and were not entitled to any other relief.4 The
final Seventh Circuit decision, however, raises a number of further
questions, primarily concerning the basic authority on which the
decision is premised: an article written in 1974 by Professors Victor
f Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1967,
Occidental College; J.D. 1970, University of Michigan. Acting Director, University
of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Study of Financial Institutions. Member of

the California Bar.
1552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 398 (1977).
2 "Battledore and Shuttlecock's a wery good game, vhen you a'n't the shuttlecock

and two lawyers the battledores, in which case it gets too excitin' to be pleasant."
C. DICKENS, PicKwICK PAPERs, Ch. 20. Further, the fourteen year duration of the
case and the resultant attorneys' fees that must have been generated bring to
mind Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr.'s poetic remark that "Knowledge may starve
while Law/grows fat." THE POETiCAL WoRMs OF OLrvER WENDE.
HoLMEs 118,

120 (Cambridge ed. 1975).
8 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd,

403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated and -remanded,396 U.S. 375 (1970).
4552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 398 (1977). The district
court's decision on the computation of the damages is unreported. The district
court had decided earlier that it would be impractical to rescind the merger. See
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. BEP. (CCH)

193, 354 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1972).
(955)

956

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 126:955

Brudney and Marvin Chirelstein 5 that dealt with the evaluation of
fairness of terms in controlled merger situations.6 The Brudney &
Chirelstein article contains much useful analysis and is without
doubt a significant and provocative contribution to the literature
in an area that simply does not admit of any completely satisfactory
answers, but there is substantial reason to doubt whether the analysis
which it proposes is grounded in sound theory. In addition, it is
clear from the Seventh Circuit decision in Mills that the court did
not fully understand the concepts set forth in the Brudney & Chirlestein article; to some extent, that incapacity on the court's part may
have been due to an incomplete articulation of some basic ideas of
the article.
The adoption of the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis by the
Seventh Circuit makes it important to focus attention on the flaws
in that approach as well as on the errant application of the analysis
by the Seventh Circuit, particularly during a period in which it
appears that the courts will increasingly be drawn into fairness
evaluations. 7 Moreover, the recent proposal of the Securities and
Exchange Commission s to require fairness in controlled mergers
pursuant to its rulemaking power under section 13 9 of the Securities
5 Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers,
88 HAIv. L. REv. 297 (1974).
6 Controlled mergers, as that term is used in this Article, occur when the
acquiring corporation, prior to the merger, exercises such significant control over
the acquired corporation that the transaction cannot reasonably be viewed as negotiated at arms' length. See id. 298.
7See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); McNally v.
Vickers Energy Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. IM. 1977); Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d
1121 (Del. 1977); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976).
Cf. People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.),
atfd mem., 50 App. Div. 2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975) (injunction granted by
trial court to state attorney general to halt defendant from "going private" in order
to protect investors from falling prey to "self-interested majority").
s Proposed Rule-Going Private Transactions By Public Companies or Their
Affiliates, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090, 60,101 (1977).
9But cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding that
allegations of unfairness do not state a claim under § 10 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and rule 1Ob-5 thereunder). While the SEC may have greater authority
under § 13(e) of the Act than under § 10, and while Santa Fe did not involve any
specific rule promulgated under § 10 to address controlled mergers but was rather
a private action based on the general anti-fraud provisions, it is far from clear that
the proposed rule is within the rulemaking authority of the SEC. Indeed, the
entire disclosure orientation of the Act, as well as some of the specific language of
§ 13(e) (1) itself, strongly suggest that the rulemaking authority is limited to rules
concerning what must be disclosed, rather than rules governing substantive fairness.
Section 13(e)(1) provides that "the Commission . . . may adopt [rules] . . . to
define acts and practices which are fraudulent . . . . Such rules . . . may require
such issuer to provide holders of equity securities . . . with such information . . .
as the Commission deems necessary or appropriate . . . or . . . material."
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Exchange Act of 1934 10 is demonstrative of the importance of the
present inquiry. That proposed rule, which would permit the SEC
to become involved for the first time in a substantive fairness analysis
of securities transactions by corporations, specifically requires that
in controlled mergers and similar absorption transactions, the
"transaction [must be] fair to unaffiliated securityholders." "1 This
Article is intended first to explain the underlying theory of the
Brudney & Chirelstein article and to clarify aspects of the theory
that seem to have been misunderstood by the Seventh Circuit.
Second, the specific facts of the Mills case will be examined, because
the case provides a useful focal point for an appraisal of the question
of fairness in controlled mergers involving exchanges of stock.
Third, some questions will be raised concerning the underlying
assumptions of the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis, in order to
emphasize its limitations. Finally, the problems of applying the
Brudney &:Chirelstein approach to controlled mergers that do not
2
involve exchanges of stock will be discussed.1
I. Tin

BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN ANALYSIS

Before criticizing the Brudney k Chirelstein analysis, it is appropriate to review the analysis itself. Further, the apparent confusion of the Mills court in applying the Brudney & Chirelstein
approach suggests the utility of elucidating some of the implications
10 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1975).
"1 Proposed Rule-Going Private Transactions By Public Companies or Their
Affiliates, 42 Fed, Reg. 60,090, 60,101 (1977).
12 Although the primary focus of this Article is on the fiduciary concept advanced by Brudney & Chirelstein as the basis for their fairness analysis, see text
accompanying notes 20 & 47-53 infra, their article included a survey of traditional
judicial approaches to the fairness issue and of minority shareholders' ability to
obtain an equitable distribution. In that context Brudney & Chirelstein evaluated
in some depth the ratification rights of minority shareholders, the efficacy of disclosure mechanisms, see Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 299-304, and the
extent of protection provided by appraisal rights, id. 304-07. It may be that their
rejection of those alternatives will provide useful background for legislatures that
consider the need for statutory revision, even though it is suggested in this Article
that their own solution to the problem of fairness is not satisfactory. Brudney &
Chirelstein also examined in some depth the question of mergers following tender
offers and the purchase of control for a premium. Id. 330-44. None of those issues
is fully addressed in this Article for the simple reason that they have all been
subjected to substantial scrutiny in the literature. See, e.g., ABA National Institute,
Corporate Takeovers-The Unfriendly Tender Offer and the Minority Stockholder
Freezeout, 32 Bus. LAw. 1297 (Special Issue 1977); Buxbaum, The Dissenters
Appraisal Remedy, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1229 (1976); Hazen, Transfers of Corporate
Control and Duties of Controlling Shareholders-Common Law, Tender Offers, Investment Companies-and a Proposal for Reform, 125 U. PA. L. PEv. 1023 (1977);
Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. 1Ev. 248 (1969); Manning, Boon REmiw, 67 YAlE L.J.
1477 (1958).
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of their analysis as applied to controlled mergers in which the
minority shareholders of the subsidiary receive stock of the parent,
particularly since an important implication of their analysis-and
one central to the Mills decision-was rather cursory in nature, and
was contained in one footnote 13 and a sentence in the middle of a
conclusory paragraph. 14 Consequently, one cannot place all of the
blame on the Seventh Circuit for failing to be cognizant of that
implication, which is not necessarily clear intuitively. This section
of the present analysis is intended, therefore, solely to clarify certain
aspects of the Brudney 8c Chirelstein analysis; it is not intended to
contradict that analysis.
The significant point made in the Brudney &cChirelstein article
is that the traditional post factum measure of fairness, which is
described as the "give-get" formula, is inadequate when applied to
certain mergers. The traditional mode of analysis has been merely
to compare the market value of the minority shareholders' interest
in the controlled corporation prior to the transaction with the value
of the consideration received by them.i n Brudney & Chirelstein,
however, argue that mergers frequently result in additional benefits
to the acquiring corporation that are not reflected in the prior
market value of the acquired entity and that the minority shareholders are entitled to participate in those benefits. For example,
the merger may make available any number of operating efficiencies,
economies of scale, or other benefits that will make the whole of
the combined entity worth more than the sum of the pre-existing
parts. Moreover, the management of the controlling entity is most
apt to know of the availability of those benefits and of when the
disparity between market value and "real" value is greatest. That
knowledge should create additional reason to be dissatisfied with a
procedure for valuation that gives the minority shareholders no
more than the pre-merger market value of their interests in the
subsidiary. The authors then assert that the review of fairness
should not be limited to the question whether the minority shareholders received equivalent value for their interest-the "give-get"
'3 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 310-11 n.36. The key statement was
that "sharing in the gains occurs if both enterprises are valued on a premerger basis
and the parent's stock, so valued, is the currency in which the subsidiary's public

stockholders are paid." Id. (emphasis in original).
14 Id. 323. The key statement here was that the Brudney & Chirelstein fairness
analysis "is satisfied by an exchange of shares based on the premerger [market]
value of each entity." Id. See text accompanying notes 27-29, infra.
15 Id. 310-12 & n.37.

See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble Skogmo, Inc., 332 F. Supp.

644 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Bastian v. Bourns Inc.,
256 A.2d 680 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 278 A.2d 467 (Del. 1970).
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formula-but should include an analysis of whether the additional
benefits resulting from the merger were fairly allocated between the
parent and the minority shareholders of the subsidiary. That is,
Brudney .3 Chirelstein challenge the courts to recognize that there
is an additional benefit to be recognized in merger transactions, and
they assert that the courts are simply not going far enough if they
examine only the corpus of what is surrendered by the minority
shareholders.1 6
In examining how properly to allocate the merger benefits, the
authors suggest two alternatives: a straw man, which they properly
reject, and their own solution. The straw man alternative springs
from a sense that the additional benefit from the merger, which
the Seventh Circuit in Mills refers to as the synergistic effect of the
merger,17 might be divided between parent and subsidiary on the
basis of their relative bargaining power, under the theory that
parties bargaining at arms' length might have arrived at some
negotiated agreement.'
Rejecting that concept as without any firm
footing, 9 Brudney & Chirelstein suggest instead that the courts
draw from what should, in their view, be the duty of a fiduciary
managing trust funds of different sizes but comparable investment
goals. They assert that such a fiduciary should allocate any savings
or investment opportunity in proportion to the size of the funds,
thereby ensuring proportionate sharing in the benefit by equalizing
the return on investment for each of the funds.2 0 For comparable
reasons, they argue for a sharing of the merger benefits in proportion to the size, as measured by market value, of the entities that
existed prior to the merger.
The authors set forth a hypothetical that is instructive in understanding their analysis. They assume that the following facts
prevail:
Price/ Earnings
OutEarnings Per
standing Market
Multiple Share
Shares
Price
Parent (P)
10
$12
1,000,000
$120
Subsidiary (S)10
$.50
2,000,400*
$5

Total Market
Value of
PublicShares
$120,000,000
$ 5,000,000*

01,000,000 shares are held by the public, the remainder by P; P's share
(50.01%) of S's earnings is a part of P's earnings in the hypothetical.
16Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 313-14, 321-23.
17 552 F.2d at 1248.
18 See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 315-16.
19 Id.316-18.
20 Id. 318-22.
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Brudney & Chirelstein further assume that when S is
merged into P the synergistic effect is such that the post-merger P
has a market value of $135 million, which they assume will be the
total market value of P regardless of how many shares of P are issued
to the minority shareholders of S; that is, however many shares of P
may be outstanding after the merger, the .price per share of P will
21
adjust to yield a total market value of $135 million.
This hypothetical yields three possible conclusions in evaluating whether the minority shareholders of S received "fair" compensation in the transaction. First, under the "give-get" test, the
transaction will be fair if the minority shareholders receive a value
equal to the $5 million worth of S shares surrendered. If shares of
P are issued, the "give-get" test is satisfied by the issuance to the
minority of 38,462 P shares, each of which will have a market value
of $130. 2 Under the negotiation test, the $10 million increment in
value resulting from the merger would most likely be split evenly
between P and S.23 Because P itself owns approximately one-half
of S, P shareholders would receive $5 million of the increment
directly and $2.5 million indirectly. The minority shareholders of
S would be entitled to the remaining $2.5 million of merger benefit
plus the $5 million of value they surrendered, for a total of $7.5
21

See id. 313.

22 The

determination of the number of shares and price follows from the

solution of simultaneous equations. If x is the number of shares of P to be received
by the S shareholders, and p is the post-merger price per share of P shares, the
"give-get" approach requires as a minimum that xp = $5,000,000. Furthermore,
since all post-merger shares must have the same price, and the P shareholders will
continue to hold 1,000,000 shares, and the total market value of the new enterprise
is assumed to be constant at $135 million, it follows that
(x + 1,000,000)p = $135,000,000
Solving the equations simultaneously:

($5,000,000

+ 1,000,000

$5,000,000 + 1,ooo,o00p
1,o0oooop
p

) p=

$135,000,000

= $135,000,000
= $130,000,000
= $130

so that
x
= 38,462.
Although Brudney & Chirelstein argue in principle that the allocation under
the negotiation test depends on the relative bargaining power of the parties, see
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 315-16, they conclude that in fact the
synergy will probably be divided equally. That conclusion springs from their assertion that a weighing of relative bargaining power involves an evaluation of "indeterminate variables"; as a result, the even split is a likely outcome because it has "an
appearance of neutrality and evenhandedness." Id. 316.
23
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million. If shares of P are issued in the merger, the minority
shareholders would receive 58,823 shares of P having a value of
$127.50 per share. 24
If the Brudney & Chirelstein solution is accepted, however, the
synergy should be allocated in proportion to the total market values
of the entities before the merger. Specifically, reducing the authors'
approach to a formula, the "fair" amount of compensation to
minority shareholders is equal to:
MB [Formula B-1]

-k~
k
v

+ \Mkt
Mkt
Mkt.
Mkt

where
Mkt -. Total market value of the minority ownership of S
Mkt = Total market value of P
MB = Additional benefit from the merger.
The minority shareholders should therefore receive value equal to
the value of S stock surrendered plus a proportionate share, determined by reference to market values, of the additional benefits
expected from the merger. 25 Such a proportionate allocation of the
merger benefit would, according to Brudney & Chirelstein, conform
to the fiduciary obligation of a trustee managing trusts of different
sizes. In the hypothetical above, the "fair" compensation to the
minority shareholders of S under this theory is:

$5000,000 +

/$5,000,000

, $5,000,000 + $120,000,000/

=
=
24

$5,000,000 +

-

$10,000,000

(10,000,000)

$5,400,000

See note 22 supra. In this case:

xp = $7,500,000
(x + 1,O00,O00)p = $135,000,000
1,000,000 p = $135,000,000
$7,50,00
p

$135,000,000 - $7,500,000
p=
1,000,000
p = $127.50

so that
25

x = 58,823
Brudney & Chireistein, supra note 5, at 321.

The division of the merger

benefit into a $400,000 portion to the minority shareholders of S and a $9,600,000
portion to the shareholders of P yields an equal 8 per cent return on the respective
investments of $5 million and $120 million.
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If the compensation to the minority shareholders is all in the form
of P's stock, it then follows that the merger terms are fair only when
the minority shareholders of S receive 41,667 shares of P, the price
of which will be $129.60 per share.2 6 Under these circumstances,
the minority shareholders receive a total value of $5.4 million,
which is their original value of $5 million in S stock plus 5/125
of the $10 million merger benefit.
But it is only in a footnote ten pages before and in the middle
of a paragraph two pages after this analysis that the authors make
the observation, which follows directly from the foregoing formula,
that in the case of a stock merger an exchange of shares in the ratio
of the pre-merger market values of the companies necessarily satisfies
the theory.27 Therefore, the notion of a proportionate sharing in
the merger benefit, although conceptually helpful, is surplusage in
the formula when applied to a stock merger. If the number of
shares of P issued to the minority shareholders is in the same proportion to the number of shares of S formerly held by them as the
pre-merger price of a share of S is to the price of a share of P, the
participants will necessarily retain their proportionate shares in the
synergy resulting from the merger. The analysis of relative market
values of S and P answers the following question: "If S has a given
total public market value, how many shares of S must exist in order
for each share to have the same price as one share of P?" Because
the merger benefit will be reflected in the post-merger price of P, a
proportionate sharing of benefits in the stock merger case will be
ensured by putting pre-merger shares of S on the same footing as
those of P. That follows from the critical point made by Brudney
& Chirelstein, which is that the minority shareholders should have
the same portion of the post-merger combined entity that they had
of the premerger entities, and portions are determined as a percentage of total market value. Expressing this concept in a formula,
26

See note 22 supra. In this case:

xp = $5,400,000
(x + 1,000,00o)p = $135,000,000
$95,400,000
- 1,000,000 ) p = $135,000,000
$135,000,000 - $5,400,000
p=

1,000,000
p = $129.60
so that
27

x = 41,667
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 310-11 n.36, 323.
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the total number of shares of P that should be issued to the minority

shareholders of S is:
Shs

=

X Sh.)
MP"

[Formula B-2]

Sh,, is the number of P shares issued in exchange for S shares;
MP. is the pre-merger market price of one S share;
Sh, is the total number of S shares outstanding in the public's
hands; and
MP, is the pre-merger market price of one P share. 28
The number of shares issuable in exchange for each pre-merger
share of S is therefore in proportion to the pre-merger market prices
of S and P stock:
Fair Exchange Ratio

ShP
-

Sh

Sh,

=

MP.

-

[Formula B-3]

MPP

It is important to note one additional aspect of the article that
raises problems: not all, and perhaps not even most, controlled
mergers involve the issuance of stock. In considering that factor,
Brudney &cChirelstein merely note in passing that their approach is
to be followed in "cash-outs" or similar transactions, with the merger
For those who prefer to see the algebra step by step, to simplify notation let:
a= pre-merger price of P per share
b = number of P shares outstanding prior to merger
c = pre-merger price of S per share
d = number of S shares held by public prior to merger
x = post-merger number of P shares
y = post-merger price per P share
Formula B-1 can therefore be expressed as
28

cd + (cd
(aT - (ab + cd))
cd +ab)
since total market value (Mkt s and Mkt p) is equal to the number of shares times
the price of each and MB is defined as the market value of the combined entity
minus the sum of the market values of the separate entities (after eliminating the
value of Ps holdings in S, which are included in Ps market value).
Moreover, formula B-1 was posited to establish the compensation that is to be
received by S's minority shareholders, which is necessarily equal to the number of
shares they receive of P times y since, after the merger, all P shares must have the
same price. If z is that number of shares, then
z+b=x
because the P shareholders will not receive any additional shares. (If this last fact
were not true, the number yielded by the formula developed here for z would have
to be multiplied by the number of P shares held by P shareholders after the
merger divided by the number previously held by those persons.) The total num-
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benefit possibly to be paid even subsequent to- the transaction. 29
As will be shown, that suggestion entails immense difficulties that
the authors do not attempt to resolve.
her of shares to be issued to the public S shareholders must then be formula
B-1 - y, so that

( cd
cd +

e.d + ab

(xy -

ab -

cd)

z
cdxy -

y
cd (ab + cd)

zy=cd +

cdxy
=cd +

cd+ab

-cd
ed+ab

cdx
Z=
cd + ab.
Substituting z + b for x, then
cd (z + b)
z =
cd + ab
cdz + abz = cdz + cdb
abz = cdb
cd
z =

-

a
which is formula B-2 expressed in the notation of this footnote. Formula B-3 may
then be derived by dividing both sides of the equation by d, the total number of S
shares held by the public:
z
-

=

shares of parent to be issued per subsidiary share =

C
-

d
a
Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 323. It may provide some insight
to express formula B-1 in terms of market price/earnings multiples. When so
viewed, that formula provides that the minority shareholders of the subsidiary are
entitled to the market multiple of their "old" earnings plus a proportionate part,
based on pre-merger market prices, of the amount by which the market multiple
applicable to the post-merger entity multiplied by its earnings exceeds the sum
of the earnings of the pre-merger entities multiplied by the market price/earnings
multiples applicable to each. Viewed in that manner, the amount of the merger
benefit will depend upon both the earnings of the post-merger entity and the
price/earnings multiple it commands. The Brudney & Chirelstein analysis is
designed to give each participant in the merger a market-proportionate share in this
benefit, but since the benefit itself is determined by the characteristics of the participants, such as the price/earnings multiples they command, it is not altogether
apparent that the sharing formula is equitably based. Assume, as is often likely
to be true, particularly if the subsidiary is considerably smaller than the parent,
that the post-merger entity carries a multiple equal to that of the pre-merger parent.
If that multiple is higher than that of the subsidiary, by what logic should the
subsidiary's former shareholders share in this benefit that resulted solely from a
characteristic of the parent? If the subsidiary's multiple were higher, why should
the participatory right of its former shareholders in an increased income stream be
reduced by the lower multiple of the parent? The first element of formula B-1
creates in the subsidiary's shareholders an entitlement to the market multiple of
their former corporation's earnings; in equity, should not a comparable right relate
29
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II.

BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN IN OPERATION:

Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
The most recent Mills decision is important to the present
inquiry in two respects. First, as the culmination of fourteen years
of litigation involving five reported decisions-including one by the
Supreme Court-it is likely to receive significant attention. The
Seventh Circuit's decision, in the final round of the case, to embrace
fully the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis therefore requires some
comment, particularly in light of the confusion inherent in the
decision. In addition, as a case presenting rather squarely the type
of situation which is under discussion here, it provides a useful focal
point for the analysis.
Mills involved a merger of Electric Auto-Lite Company ("AutoLite") into Mergenthaler Linotype Company ("Mergenthaler"), followed by the change of Mergenthaler's name to Eltra Corporation
("Eltra").3 0 Mergenthaler had begun to purchase common stock of
Auto-Lite in 1957 and had acquired 54.2 percent of that stock by
1962, thereby achieving operating control of Auto-Lite.3 1 The
merger of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler occurred in 1963. The
merger proxy statement, however, although stating that the AutoLite board of directors had approved the merger, failed to disclose
32
that the board was already under the control of Mergenthaler.
The district court found this omission to be material, and, on the
first appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with that holding; the defendants would, however, have been permitted by the court of
to their share of the post-merger corporation's earnings? Under such an approach,
the fair share of such persons would be:
Mkts -+-

(Y

) (pem,)

Mkt. + Mkt,
where all terms have the definitions of formula B-1, and
Yr = the estimated annual increase in income of the post-merger entity
attributable to the merger and
pem = the price/earnings multiple of S prior to the merger.
That formula is, of course, much more difficult to apply than formula B-1, particularly since it cannot usefully be reduced further, but it at least recognizes an
intangible asset (price/earnings multiple) of the pre-merger entities. Under this
formula, the minority shareholders would receive not a share of the increment in
value of the post-merger enterprise, but a share of the post-merger incremental
income multiplied by the acquired entity's historical multiplier. Benefits or detriments attributable to a reevaluation of the merged entity's multiplier by the
market become the risk of the parent. See text accompanying note 81, infra.
S0 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1240 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
98 S. Ct. 398 (1977).
31 Id.
32 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 378 (1970).
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appeals to show "by a preponderance of probabilities that the merger
would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy statement
had not been misleading . . . . 33 The Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit on the issue of causation, holding that under the
proxy rules of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 it was necessary
to show only that the omission "was of such a character that it
might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder
who was in the process of deciding how to vote." 34 On remand
both the district court and the Seventh Circuit viewed the only
question before them to be whether, in fact, the terms of the merger
were fair to the minority shareholders of Auto-Lite.85
33Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 1968), rev'd,
396 U.S. 375 (1970).
34 396 U.S. at 384. The Supreme Court decision went on to say:
[A] shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here,
he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect
in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment
of the transaction.
Id. 385.
35 The history of the Mills case may be seen to suggest a troublesome problem
quite apart from the use of the Brudney & Chireistein analysis. After seven years
the Supreme Court confirmed that the material omission in a proxy statement, which
was a violation of section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (1970), gave rise to a cause of action. After another seven years the Seventh
Circuit determined that there were no damages. There is at least, then, the suggestion of what the law abhors: a wrong without a remedy. Fortunately, three
elements make the finding of the wrong significant and give real meaning to that
finding, notwithstanding the ultimate conclusion of Mills. First, the Supreme Court's
decision in Mills put another arrow in the aggrieved investor's quiver, a practice
that the Court has abstained from conspicuously in more recent years. See Piper v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
In addition, the SEC is able, in appropriate cases, to obtain relief of an injunctive
nature when omissions of the Mills type are found. Cf., e.g., Henwood v. SEC,
298 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1962); SEC v. Okin, 137 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1943); SEC
v. May, 134 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956).
Second, even though rescission of the merger was deemed inappropriate in
Mills, that holding was partially due to the seven-year period that was consumed
in determining the existence of a section 14 violation. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., [1971-72 Transfer Binder] Fan. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 793,354 (N.D. I11.
Jan.,
10, 1972). See also Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977); Swanson
v. American Consumer Indus., Inc., 475 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1973). In future
cases the determination that a section 14 violation exists will presumably be made
more easily, and rescission may become a viable alternative. For the plaintiff who
acts quickly enough, a compelled resolicitation of proxies may well be available as
a remedy. E.g., Central Foundry Co. v. Gondelman, 166 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) . It is, however, likely that the resolicitation remedy will not be viewed as
sufficient by plaintiffs who bring actions under section 14, since control of the
proxy machinery is effectively equivalent to control of the vote; therefore, resolicitation would probably again generate an approval of the merger. See Hetherington, supra note 12 at 252-55; Manning, supra note 12 at 1483 n.17.
Finally, and perhaps most important, there is an inherent confusion between
the nature of the wrong and the nature of the remedy in cases like Mills. The
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The facts necessary to apply a Brudney & Chirelstein analysis to
the Mills case were reasonably clear as set forth in the Seventh
Circuit opinion. Mergenthaler had 2,698,822 common shares outstanding prior to the merger, which shares traded at an average price
of $24.875 over the six months prior to the merger. Of the 1,159,265
Auto-Lite common shares outstanding immediately prior to the
merger, 532,550 shares were held by the public and they traded at
an average market price of $52.25 in the six months before the
merger. Under the terms of the merger, one Mergenthaler share
became one common share of Eltra; each share of Auto-Lite became
1.88 shares of preferred stock of Eltra, convertible into Eltra common at the rate of one common share per preferred share in the
first two years of the merger and at declining rates thereafter over
the next three years, after which the conversion option expired.
During a period of one month following the merger, Eltra preferred
traded at an average price of $31.06 and Eltra common traded at an
average price of $25.25. Determining equivalence by reference to
market values, each preferred share of Eltra was equivalent to approximately 1.23 common shares ($31.06 market price of Eltra
preferred -- $25.25 market price of Eltra common). Consequently,
the merger terms could be considered as 2.31 equivalent common
shares of Eltra being issued for each share of Auto-Lite (1.88 preferred Eltra shares X 1.23 equivalence factor between preferred
and common).3 6
As a preliminary matter, the Seventh Circuit examined the data
and concluded "that when market value is available and reliable,
other factors should not be utilized in determining whether the
wrong claimed is not unfairness, but rather nondisclosure. After the fact, however,
the nondisclosure wrong cannot be meaningfully remedied. The unfairness claim
may be seen as a hybrid private right of action that is developing under section 14.
The recent cases make clear that there is no federal cause of action (under section
10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and rule 10b-5) for the unfairness per se
of merger terms. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
But cf. Proposed Rule-Going Private By Public Companies or Their Affiliates, 42
Fed. Reg. 60,090 (1977) and Proposed Rule--Regulation of Issuer Tender Offers,
42 Fed. Reg. 63,066 (1977) (proposing under section 13 to identify and require
fairness in "going private" mergers). Conversely there is no true remedy for nondisclosure. But under the Supreme Court's decision in Mills, the unfairness remedy
will become available if the private plaintiff can establish the nondisclosure wrong.
Admittedly, the potential remedy is not related to the wrong, but Mills creates one
remedy for the combination of nondisclosure and unfairness, where none other
would be possible in the federal courts. Cf. Kaye v. Pantone, [current] CCH See.
Reg. Rptr. I[96,336 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 1978) (discussing the same problem in the
rule 10b-5 context).
26 Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1241-43, 1248-49 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 398 (1977).
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terms of a merger were fair." 37 Although that conclusion is subject
to some doubt for reasons that will be examined subsequently, it is
certainly a prerequisite to an acceptance of the Brudney & Chirelstein approach, since that approach is grounded in the acceptance
of relative pre-merger market values.38 It should therefore have
been relatively easy for the Seventh Circuit to apply the Brudney &
Chirelstein approach: Using formula B-3 above, the merger would
be deemed fair to the Auto-Lite minority shareholders if the exchange ratio of Eltra common shares for Auto-Lite shares was at
least
MP.

$52.25

MP,

$24.875

- 2.189

Since the actual exchange ratio of 2.31 was well in excess of the
"fair" ratio, the terms of the merger should have been approved on
that basis. Remarkably, however, the Seventh Circuit, although
fully endorsing the Brudney &cChirelstein analysis, rejected that
clear and simple computation:
The simplest method

. . .

would be to compare the price

ratio, in this case 2.1, to the effective exchange ratio . ..
2.31. Under this framework the merger would be fair ....
This method of calculation, however, assumes that the
new corporation ... is worth exactly as much as the sum
of . . . its two component parts . . .before the merger.

As Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have cogently
pointed out, this assumption is usually false ....

40

The Seventh Circuit did not appreciate the simplicity of the
Brudney & Chirelstein analysis in the stock merger situation, because
the court then reverted to the more complicated, but fully equivalent, B-1 formulation. Thus, the court concluded that the merger
was fair since the Auto-Lite shareholders had received value of
$32,095,594, which exceeded the dollar value of their Auto-Lite
holdings ($27,825,737) plus a proportionate part ($27,825,737/
$94,958,934) of the amount by which the total post-merger value of
Eltra ($99,240,849) exceeded the combined pre-merger values of
371d. 1247.
38 The Seventh Circuit properly observed that post-merger earnings were not

a basis upon which to determine the relative values of Mergenthaler and Auto-Lite,
since there was substantial commingling of assets and managerial talent; in addition,
Auto-Lite's expenses on a divisional basis were probably understated. Id. 1243-44.
39 See id. 1247.
40 Id. 1248.
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Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler ($94,958,934). 41 For some reason that

defies explanation, the court in several instances mixed wrong computations of share amounts with right computations of dollar
amounts, but was finally drawn to the conclusion that comported
42
with the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis.
If the court were guilty only of a failure to recognize the
equivalence of the B-1 and B-3 formulae, it would be both unfair
and unseemly to give the matter excessive attention. However, there
is no real authority in this area other than the Brudney &kChirelstein article, which can easily but unintentionally mislead. Furthermore, the rejection of the 2.1 exchange ratio suggests a misconception of the supposed error in the "give-get" approach that the
Brudney & Chirelstein analysis was seeking to correct. As long as
the ratio of pre-merger prices is used, there will be a proportionate
allocation of the merger benefit. 43 The "give-get" approach as
characterized by Brudney & Chirelstein would have been satisfied if
the Auto-Lite shareholders had received 1,051,530 common shares of
41 Id.1248-49. Indeed, the court subsequently initiated a discussion which, if
completed, would have demonstrated the fallacy of the quoted portion of the
opinion. The court observed that the calculation under fonnula B-1 would yield a
fair value to Auto-Lite shareholders of $29,080,338 or, using the actual value of
Eltra common stock, 1,151,696.5 equivalent shares of Eltra common at $25.25 per
share. Id. 1249. The court then properly observed:
[Tihe price of Eltra common depended in part on the exchange ratio
actually used ... [If we assume ...an effective exchange ratio of 2.16
to 1 [1,151,696.5 equivalent shares of Eltra common - 532,550 shares of
Auto-Lite surrendered by minority shareholders], there would have been
the equivalent of . . .3,849,130 Eltra common shares outstanding. Since
the total post-merger value of Eltra was $99,240,849 the price of one share
of Eltra common would rise to . . .$25.78. However, the figures in the
text give a good approximation ....
Id. 1249 n.17. If the Mills court had completed that analysis, it would have noted
that at a price of $25.78, the 1,151,696.5 equivalent shares of Eltra common would
have a value of $29,690,735, or $610,397 more than the amount the court had
properly determined to be fair. If the court had then adjusted its calculation of
the number of Eltra common shares to be delivered to the Auto-Lite minority in
view of the $25.78 price, it would have found that the exchange ratio moved downward, the price per share moved upward and another adjustment was necessary.
The limit would be approached at a price of $25.997, and the resultant issuance to
the Auto-Lite minority of 1,118,622.50 common equivalent shares of Eltra, would
yield the 2.1 exchange ratio initially rejected as a mere "price ratio." See id. 1248.
Maintaining constant the total enterprise value is, of course, necessary to the
Brudney & Chirelstein analysis since it is the total post-merger value of the enterprise that determines the benefit springing from the merger. A simpler approach
to the same question would have been to recognize that Auto-Lite minority shareholders were entitled to $29,080,338, the total enterprise value was $99,240,849,
leaving $70,160,511 to the stockholders of Mergenthaler. Since the latter group had
2,698,822 shares, the correct price for the post-merger enterprise should be $25.997;
therefore, 1,118,603 shares of Eltra at $25.997/share should have been distributed
to the Auto-Lite shareholders. Minor inconsistencies are due to rounding.
42 Id. 1249.
43 See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

970

[Vol. 126:955

Eltra with a value of $26.46 per share. 44 This would result in a
"fair" exchange ratio under the "give-get" formula of 1.975, which
is substantially less than the 2.1 exchange ratio rejected by the Mills
court as the unfair "give-get" figure. More simply, the total value
actually received by the Auto-Lite shareholders, determined by postmerger market values, exceeded the $27,825,737 surrendered, and
therefore a "give-get" analysis would need go no further. Thus, the
court misinterpreted the evil it was trying to avoid; this realization
is a ground for consternation. At the very least, the confusion of the
Seventh Circuit in applying the Brudney 9 Chirelstein analysis suggests the need for a clearer explanation of that theory. In fact, a
re-examination of the basic principles of the analysis is called for.
III. THE

BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN ANALYSIS

RE-ANALYZED

The primary value of the Brudney & Chirelstein approach is
the conceptual framework in which they seek a resolution of the
fairness question. Rather than accepting the "give-get" formulation, which ignores participation in the full benefits of the merger,
or searching for the elusive bargain that parties at arms' length
would have reached, Brudney & Chirelstein suggest, quite reasonably, that the courts are faced with a question of conflicting fiduciary obligations. 45 The directors of the parent corporation have
fiduciary obligations to two groups of shareholders and an assetthe benefit to be derived from the merger-that must be divided
between those groups in some acceptably fair manner. As noted
above, the Brudney & Chirelstein solution is to analogize the situation to a fiduciary managing two trusts who must allocate a potential
saving, or an investment opportunity, between them. It is erroneous, however, to believe that this analytical framework simplifies
the problem of deciding what "fairness" requires; in fact, it introduces substantial additional complexities. Although the traditional
"give-get" formulation requires only an appraisal of the pre-merger
value of the subsidiary and a comparison with the consideration
received by the minority shareholders, 46 the solution suggested by
Brudney & Chirelstein requires that three difficult issues be faced.
44

The 1,051,530 shares of Eltra common stock, multiplied by the price of
$26.46, yields approximately (due to rounding) the $27,825,737 actually surrendered
by the Auto-Lite minority.

See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 319-22.
"[T]he stockholder of a merged corporation is entitled to receive directly
securities substantially equal in value to those he held before the merger . . . ..
45

46

Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 DeL Ch. 293, 303, 93 A.2d 107, 112 (Sup.

Ct. 1952).
(Ch. 1931).

See Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183
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First, the fiduciary duty of one who must allocate a benefit between
two trusts needs to be defined. Second, assuming with the authors
that the fiduciary duty requires a weighted allocation of the benefit
between the trusts, valuations of the subsidiary and the parent must
be undertaken so that the corpus of the supposed trusts being
managed can be compared on some rational basis. Third, if the
analytic framework is to be at all useful to the corporate planner,
a valuation of the benefit to be allocated is also required.
A. The Nature of the Fiduciary Duty
The conflict faced by the parent's directors may usefully be
viewed (as Brudney & Chirelstein suggest) as equivalent to that
faced by a trustee managing two separate trust funds with similar
investment objectives, when the trustee has an opportunity to
reduce expenses, and the savings must be allocated between the
beneficiaries. But while the notion that the benefit should be allocated in proportion to the size of the funds is logical, it is not the
"only sensible view of the trustee's obligation," 47 and there is no
clear statement of law to that effect, as the Brudney & Chirelstein
48
article itself makes clear.
Let us suppose that two investment funds are managed by a
single adviser. Fund A has $100,000 and fund B has $50,000 in
assets. Let us further suppose that the administrative cost of managing fund A alone is $1,100 and fund B alone is $700, but that together they can be managed at a cost of $1,200. The Brudney 8
Chirelstein approach suggests that the $600 saving resulting from
joint management should be allocated in proportion to the size of
the funds; that is, $400 to fund A, leaving it with a charge of $700,
and $200 to fund B, leaving it with a charge of $500. But by what
logical compulsion is that answer "fairer" than allocating the remaining charge, rather than the savings, on a proportional basis,
leaving fund A with an $800 charge and fund B with a $400 charge,
or retaining the prior ratio of charges, thereby charging $733.33 to
fund A and $466.67 to fund B? Further, if fund A has been a
historical client, and fund B is willing to let the adviser manage its
47

See Brudney & Chireistein, supra note 5, at 319.
48The best empirical support that can be mustered for the Brudney & Chirelstein view is the practice of certain investment advisers to allocate investment
opportunities in proportion to the sizes of the various accounts managed by them.
Brudney & Chireistein, supra note 5, at 320-21 n.37. The authors themselves admit
that this is a "far from exclusive practice." Id. In addition, they report that "the
Securities and Exchange Commission has indicated that a wide variety of allocation
practices are used" by investment advisors. Id. See notes 49-53 infra & accompanying text.
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funds for a charge of not more than $150, should the adviser be
under some fiduciary constraint to refuse the account even though
accepting it would save fund A $50? If fund A has an exclusive
contract for the adviser's services, but is willing to let fund B share
in them provided that fund B pays at least $650 of the $1,200, cannot
the adviser make that provision? If this is a world of perfect
competition, equivalent advisorial talents would not be available
for less than $700 to fund B, absent some ability to share expenses
with another fund. Allocating the savings proportionately would
lead to identical percentage "returns" from the savings, but allocating the post-savings cost proportionately would equalize total
investment returns (assuming equal investment success with each
fund) and other arguments can be made for each of the suggestions
above. It should be apparent that the duty of the adviser as a
fiduciary is unclear: any of the suggested methods of allocating the
administrative saving may reasonably be viewed as "fair." 49 Although a court might properly label as "unfair" any allocation that
would result in fund B's paying more than $700 or in fund A's
paying more than $1,100, it is impossible to pinpoint any one "fair"
basis for allocating the charge within those extremes.50
Nor is it clear empirically that fiduciaries view themselves as
having such a duty of proportionality in administering two managed
accounts. Although that practice is followed by some investment
advisory organizations, they are in a minority.51 The practice of
49
In many real world cases, the precise considerations discussed here are not
really pertinent questions, because the trustee/advisory fee is a percentage and the
fiduciary bears most expenses of the type that could give rise to a pooled savings;
therefore, any such savings simply increase the fiduciary's effective fee. See 2 SEC,
LNsTITrrTIONAL

INVESTOR

STUDY REPORT

OF TIIE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE

COM-

MISsION 207, 454-56, 458-59, 476-79 H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1971). If economies lead to reduced percentage fees, the Brudney & Chirelstein
sharing formula may as a consequence be achieved, but that is an effect rather than
a cause.
50 It is possible that an economic model can be constructed to yield economically efficient answers to the allocation problem, since the issue may be comparable to the peak load pricing problem, although there are some significant
differences. See Boiteaux, La Tarification des demandes en pointe, 58 REvuE
GhNiRALE DE L'ELECTiuCrrE 321 (1949); Lome, Natural Gas Pipelines, Peak Load
Pricing and the FederalPower Commission, 1972 DuxE L.J. 85; Steiner, Peak Loads
and Efficient Pricing, Q.J. EcoN. 585 (1957). However, the nature of the assumptions that must be made concerning relative strengths of demand to generate
reasonably specific implications for behavior are likely to render those implications
useless to the present analysis. Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the economically efficient approach is equivalent to the fiduciary duty.
51
See 2 SEC, INSTrUTrONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SEc'MrltS &
EXCHANGE CoMMssroN 348-49 H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
Of 106 investment advisers responding, 34 had no allocation policy, 27 prorated
orders on the basis of purchase requests by clients or portfolio managers within the
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pooling small bank trust funds 52 achieves proportionality of return,
but it is the result of pooling for practical reasons, rather than the
cause for the pooling; indeed, if separate trust funds are pooled, the
subsequent charges will typically be in proportion to the size of the
funds and there will be no proportionate allocation of the saving
as such. Moreover, if the Brudney & Chirelstein view of the fiduciary duty were accepted, there would appear to be an impropriety
in a fiduciary's managing two separate funds with similar objectives
in anything but a pooled fashion; yet the extent to which funds are
in fact separately administered in highly regulated industries compels the conclusion that the law does not view this practice as
improper. 3
Thus, not only is there no clear law to the effect of requiring
proportional sharing of a savings resulting from joint administration
of two funds, there is no logic to compel the development of such a
body of law. It is somewhat disingenuous to draw upon the law
applicable to fiduciaries to determine the obligations of the parent's
directors, and then to posit with neither substantial precedent nor
compelling basis in theory, the law that is being borrowed. Moreover, even if the fiduciary duty as defined by Brudney & Chirelstein
were accepted, its application to the controlled merger context is at
best dubious. It is not at all dear that the value of a corporation
can be quantified as easily as the corpus of a trust, and there may not
exist "savings" in a merger to which shareholders of both the parent
and the subsidiary have some equivalent claim of right. Those
questions are examined in the sections that follow.
B. The Nature and Source of the Benefit to be Allocated
It is one thing to propose a clean, simple model of fairness that
is analogous to a trustee who obtains a saving for two managed trusts
and allocates this saving on a basis that plausibly satisfies a sense of
propriety concerning the sharing formula. It is, however, quite
another matter to apply that model to controlled merger cases,
because in those situations the benefit to be allocated is not a simple
saving but rather a post-merger market value for the new enterprise
that is different from the combined pre-merger market values of the
advisory organization, 10 rotated accounts to give long-term equality and 24 did
not identify an allocation basis. Some organizations do allocate on the basis of
size of the fund. Id. 348-55, 782.
52
See id. 444-50.
53 Of course, the prevalence of the practice is not a completely satisfactory
indication as to what the law is or should be. But in a field of the law that has
been subjected to so much scrutiny, over so long a period of time, it seems unlikely
that any obvious duty has been overlooked.
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pre-existing enterprises. Notions of how the benefit should be
allocated may well depend upon the source from which the benefit
springs. This section therefore examines in greater detail the
source of merger benefits and the impact of such considerations on
ideas of how a fiduciary should allocate the benefit or on notions of
what parties at arms' length would have negotiated for.
1. The Sources of Synergy
The concept of synergy is, quite simply, that the whole may be
greater than the sum of its parts. If, for example, a parent corporation has superb management and its subsidiary has inept management which has not yet been removed by the parent for publicrelations or other reasons, a management synergy may be envisioned
from a merger which releases the parent from constraints on the
dismissal of the subsidiary's management. Managed by the parent,
the income and therefore the value of the subsidiary may well be
increased. Another type of synergy may arise when a parent and
subsidiary are in complementary types of business, so that their
complete union may make possible economies of scale, elimination
of duplicative facilities, increases in production experience and
efficiency, tax benefits, or other sorts of operating synergies.5 4 Under
a completely different analysis of value, but one no less significant
to shareholders, a form of synergy may arise if a parent sells at eight
times earnings and its subsidiary at five times earnings, and the
market continues to apply the parent's price/earnings multiple to
the combined entity.55 Under those circumstances, unless the
income of the post-merger entity is less than the total income of
the pre-merger entities, the market value of the combined entity will
exceed the sum of the prior market values due to what might be
called "market synergy." The concept of a benefit arising from a
merger thus embraces a number of different possibilities. In any
given case, it is likely that some elements or all of the foregoing, and
quite possibly others, will interact in a manner that defies accurate
projection.
2. The Right to Participate in Synergy
Accepting for the moment the proposition that mergers inevitably result in synergies, notions regarding the method of allocating
a fair share of those synergies should be affected by their sources.
54 See F. ScimE,

INuSImL MAIZ

STRUCTURE AND ECONOMUC PERFORM-

ANCE 72-122 (1970).
55 See notes 79-80 infra & accompanying text.
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It is no less true that the ability of an independent management to
negotiate for a share of the synergy would be affected by similar
considerations.56 Intriguingly, however, it is reasonable to postulate
that the factors affecting judgments with respect to what is fair in
the Brudney & Chirelstein sense may have quite a different impact
from those that would affect arms' length negotiations.
In cases where management synergy exists as described above, it
is doubtful that the inept management of the subsidiary, if able to
negotiate on an independent basis, would press hard the suggestion
that the company would be worth more with someone else managing
it. From the subsidiary shareholders' viewpoint, however, the
dictates of fairness are ambiguous. On the one hand, these shareholders could argue that they should receive a share of the synergy
because it is their company whose income will be increased in the
merger, through the elimination of duplicative management services
from the subsidiary. On the other hand, however, the superior
management of the parent is an asset of the parent's shareholders
for which they have paid in the market, and the subsidiary's shareholders have no particular entitlement to participate in it.
In the case of operating synergy, notions of fairness and the
result under arms' length bargaining may coincide when the allocation of the synergy is considered. The fairness analysis might well
suggest that both entities are contributing to and should therefore
participate in the merger benefit, although there is no particular
reason to suppose that the actual contributions to the synergy will
always coincide with the allocation of the synergy resulting from the
weight given to relative market valuations of the entities.57 In all
probability the operating synergy would also be apparent to
negotiators who are bargaining at arms' length on behalf of the
parent and subsidiary, and would affect the bargain they strike. In
cases of pure market synergy, no sense of fairness dictates that the
subsidiary's shareholders should benefit from the higher price/earnings multiple of the parent. Yet it is almost certainly true that in
an arms' length negotiation, the existence of the disparate multipliers and the parties' expectation that the subsidiary will be worth
more under the parent's umbrella than it is alone will lead to a
higher negotiated price.5 8
It is not, then, quite so simple as it might appear to allocate
the benefits of a merger between parent and subsidiary. An exam56 See Brudney & Ctirelstein, supra note 5, at 314-16.
57 Cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 316 (allocation of merger benefit
under arm's-length bargaining likely to be evenly split).
58 See notes 79-80 infra & accompanying text.
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ination of two different cases with identical pre- and post-merger
market values might well lead to different conclusions concerning
participatory rights in any synergy, depending on the source of the
synergy and the adoption of the fairness or the arms' length bargaining analysis. To return to the prior discussion of the fiduciary with
two trust funds, the case of management synergy may be analogized
to the situation in which fund A has a prior and exclusive claim to
the fiduciary's talents. The claim of the minority shareholders of
the subsidiary to a proportionate share in the benefits to be derived
from those talents then becomes questionable. The case of operating synergy may be comparable to some administrative saving
that results from the joint management of the two funds. Consequently an allocation of the synergy is appropriate, although the
ratio of market values of the two enterprises, even if accepted as
equivalent to the size of the two funds, is no more compelling as
a basis for allocating the synergy than the ratio of sales, which is
equivalent to activity of the funds, the ratio of expenses, which is
equivalent to independent charges assessed against the funds, or a
number of other ostensibly reasonable ratios. The case of market
synergy presents no basis for a claim by the minority shareholders
of the subsidiary to a participatory right in the synergy. If any
analogy is to be drawn to the case of the fiduciary with two trust
funds, market synergy seems more like an additional contribution
by the settlor of trust fund A than anything else, and a claim to a
share, asserted by the beneficiaries of fund B, is hardly colorable.
3. Negative Synergy
It is also important to recognize that synergy may be negative
and that in such a case the Brudney 8c Chirelstein formula, if
accepted, would properly yield a fair consideration which was less
than that which would result from the "give-get" approach. In the
case of stock mergers, it is clear from the Brudney & Chirelstein
formulae that the relationship of the market value of the parent's
shares received by the subsidiary's minority shareholders to the
market value of the pre-merger shares of the subsidiary depends
in part upon the post-merger price of the parent's stock. Unfortunately, the Brudney 8c Chirelstein critique of the "give-get" approach entails the risk that the pre-merger value of the minority
shareholders' interest will be viewed as a minimum. The adoption
of that view is, however, both unfair and unwise. It is unfair because if the subsidiary's minority shareholders are to be given part
of any benefit that would otherwise accrue to the parent's share-
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holders, they should also share the risk that the anticipated benefits
will not materializec 0 It is unwise because the Brudney & Chirelstein formula, to the extent that it is useful, provides a framework
for corporate planning by the parent that is destroyed if its application in the first instance is to depend on the market's evaluation of
post-merger developments, which cannot be anticipated in premerger planning.
C. The "Corpus" of the "Trust" Being Managed:
The Utility of Market Value
Finally, the application of the fiduciary concept to a factual
setting of the sort found in Mills is fraught with practical obstacles.
The adherence to market values in Mills, raises at the first level the
question of which time periods should be considered in calculating
average market value. In Mills, the "fair" exchange ratio, under a
correct application of the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis, was
2.1005025, so that 1,118,623 shares of Eltra common stock should
have been issued to Auto-Lite's minority shareholders. But if the
periods chosen for averaging market prices had yielded pre-merger
average prices of $54.75 for Auto-Lite instead of $52.25, and $23.25
for Mergenthaler instead of $24.875, the precise ratio would have
jumped to 2.355, requiring 1,254,155 shares of Eltra common stock.60
Assuming that the total market value of Eltra would remain constant, the difference between those figures would result in a shifting
of approximately $2,410,000 of the synergy to the Auto-Lite minority shareholders from that dictated by the 2.1 ratio.6 1 Moreover, at
the actual exchange ratio of 2.31, the merger of Auto-Lite and Mergenthaler would apparently have been adjudicated unfair by the
59 See F. ScHEnm, supra note 54, at 74-78.
60 In fact, Auto-Lite's high and low prices in 1963, before the merger, were
61% and 490" respectively; Mergenthaler's high was 28% and the low was 22%. See
Wall St. J., June 26, 1963, at 26, cols. 2 & 4. In 1962 the high-low for Auto-Lite
was 63%-46%; for Mergenthaler, the high-low was 33i-19,i'. See Wall St. J., Aug. 7,
1962, at 24, cols. 2 & 4. These figures are suggestive of the different results that
could be reached in determining ratios of market value, if different time periods
are selected.
61 Assuming the constant total market value of $99,242,340 the two different
exchange ratios would yield the following:
2.1 ratio
2.355 ratio
Eltra common shares to Mergenthaler holders
2,698,822
2,698,822
Eltra common equivalent shares to Auto-Lite holders
1,118,355
1,254,155
Total shares
3,817,177
3,952,977
Price per share
$25.999
$25.106
Value received by Auto-Lite holders
$29,075,980
$31,486,465
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Mills court, if the averaging periods actually used had yielded the
62
hypothesized market values.
This hypothetical result emphasizes that the use of the Brudney
& Chirelstein formula in a rigid fashion is erroneous. Although the
formula may yield a precise answer, the information on which such
an answer is based is quite imprecise. Indeed, if a blind sense of
precision is adhered to, as the Mills court did by using the Brudney
& Chirelstein formula as a litmus test for fairness, it should follow
that unless the corporate planners of a parent use the same measuring data and period as the court which subsequently examines the
fairness of the merger terms, either the subsidiary's or the parent's
shareholders will have a cause of action.63 In the Mills case, to say
that the exchange ratio of 2.31 was fair to the Auto-Lite minority
shareholders because it was greater than the precise ratio of 2.1
required by the Brudney & Chirelstein formula is ipso facto to say
that it was unfair to the Mergenthaler shareholders. If the Brudney
& Chirelstein analysis is accepted as yielding one precise answer, any
variation from that answer compels a conclusion of unfairness to
the shareholders of either the parent or the subsidiary.
A far preferable approach to the question of fairness would be
to view the Brudney & Chirelstein formula as an analytic framework and not as a litmus test. If the actual exchange ratio is within
some reasonable range suggested by using a number of potential
average market prices, it should be accepted as fair. In Mills, if the
ratio of Auto-Lite's market price to Mergenthaler's were 2.3 over the
year preceding the public announcement of the proposed merger,
2.0 over the six months preceding it and 2.4 over the six weeks
preceding it, any exchange ratio between 2.0 and 2.4 should be
62 Cf. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239, 1249 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 98 S. Ct. 398 (1977) (finding that the actual exchange ratio of 2.31
exceeded the "fair" exchange ratio of 2.16).
6
OThe cases would probably suggest a different conclusion, since the subsidiary's shareholders can claim a conflict of interest whereas public shareholders of
the parent could claim only that too high a price was paid-a claim which, absent
management shareholdings in the subsidiary, would likely not pass the business
judgment barrier. See generally Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237
N.E.2d 776 (1968); Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099
(1968). However, there is little rational basis of general application upon which
to argue that a parent's management will necessarily feel a greater loyalty to the
parent's shareholders than to the subsidiary's-the basis for a conflict of interest
claim; nor is there a basis to argue that they owe more of a duty to its subsidiary's
shareholders than to the parent's own shareholders. See generally Singer v. Creole
Petroleum Corp., 297 A.2d 440, 442 (Del. Ch. 1972), modified on other grounds,
311 A.2d 859 (De. 1973); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del.
1971); Cetty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 888 (Del. 1970); Case v.
New York Central R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643 (1965).
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accepted as within the reasonable range. The actual periods used
to generate such a range in any given case would depend on the
facts of the case. But it is important that the precise answer of the
Brudney & Chirelstein formula not be accepted too readily. There
is no general basis for preferring a six-month to a three-month
market price average. For similar reasons, it must be recognized
that no single security has a market price that is determined in a
vacuum. The difficulty of establishing the extent to which a stock's
decline was related to disclosure violations rather than general
market trends has been demonstrated in other securities cases.64 If
there is reason to believe that some generalized trend affected a
security price without regard to the specific quality of the particular
issue, that factor might properly be given recognition in controlled
merger situations as well.
But a far more profound problem than that of selecting periods
of time is suggested by the Mills court's determination that no other
factors are to be considered in evaluating the fairness of merger
terms when "market value is available and reliable." Although a
fundamental acceptance of market values and an adherence to the
views espoused by the random walk/efficient market theorists8 5 is
essential to an acceptance of the Brudney & Chirelstein approach,
the market is bound to reflect factors that destroy its ability to serve
as a reliable measure of value for evaluating the fairness of the
terms in controlled mergers. In such situations, the very existence
of control in the hands of the parent corporation will undoubtedly
skew the market's evaluation of the intrinsic value of the minority
shareholders' interests, thereby disrupting the general congruence
between market value and "true" value.68 The knowledge that
another entity controls the subsidiary will at least cause others who
might desire to obtain control to withdraw from the market, reducing current demand for the stock and diminishing the interest of
other potential buyers of the subsidiary's securities. 7 Furthermore,
no matter how far the courts or the legislatures might move toward
establishing an expectation of fairness in controlled mergers, it is
64

See, e.g., Roll v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 47 & n.22
(2d Cir. 1978); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544,

586-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
65
See, e.g,, B. MAIL,
Rev. 1975).

A

PIA-moM

WArx DowN WAmL Smn

(Coll. Ed.

66 See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 154 F. Supp. 436 (D. Conn. 1957).
67See Metz, Morton-Norwich and Takeover Problems, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,

1978 at D2, cols. 3-4. Cf. Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d 570 (Del.

Ch- 1976) (disclosure that tender offer might result in inactive market and/or

deregistration for remaining shares of target company not a basis for liability under

Delaware law).
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likely that the market will react to a fear that the controlling shareholder will use its control to the disadvantage of the subsidiary or
to time a merger so as to take advantage of short-term market
factors. In short, the parent's ability to do the very things that
prompted in part the Brudney & Chirelstein fairness analysis may
make market prices in controlled mergers unreliable.
Thus, there is substantial doubt about whether the market
price of a partially-owned subsidiary can ever be truly reliable in
the sense of reflecting the value that the subsidiary would have,
shorn of the parent's domination. Yet it is clear that such a consideration was not thought by the Seventh Circuit in Mills to lead
to an unreliable market, even though Auto-Lite had been controlled
by Mergenthaler for a number of years prior to the merger.6 8 Rather, the decision suggests that misleading or incomplete disclosures
of a market-relevant type are the only factors that might lead a
69
market to be unreliable.
It may be that a merger following a tender offer, where the
controlled subsidiary had a recent and active market for its stock,
would provide an environment in which the Brudney & Chirelstein
analysis could reasonably be applied.70 Even in that context, how68

See 552 F.2d at 1245-47. In the specific facts of Mills, it might be argued
that this consideration is of less significance since Mergenthaler itself was a controlled subsidiary, and its shares would be subject to the same downward pressure
on price. However, there is no particular reason to assume that the market's
reaction to the minority status of the public shares was proportionate as between
the two corporations.
69
Itmay not be inconsistent with the Mills opinion to suggest that a "lowdemand" market would be unreliable, see Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 351 A.2d
570 (Del. Ch. 1976), unlike a market depressed by the ownership of a controlling
block of stock by another party.
70 Brudney & Chirelstein themselves, however, would reject the application of
their analysis to the tender offer situation on the grounds of potential unfairness to
nontendering shareholders, except when the merger is not viewed by the parent as
a part of the tender process. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 330-40. In
the latter context, however, there is likely to be a time differential that would
destroy the reliability of the market. To a substantial degree, the authors' notions
of fairness in the case of a merger shortly after the acquisition of control by tender
or by private purchase are affected by the long-standing view of some commentators that control is a corporate asset, and that no one group of stockholders is
entitled to be paid an additional sum for it. See, e.g., Andrews, The Stockholder's
Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares, 85 RA1&v. L. BEv. 505 (1965);
Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of CorporateControl, 50 Commsm L.Q. 628 (1965);
Jennings, Trading in Corporate Control, 44 CALd.L. REv. 1 (1956); Leech, Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. 11Ev. 725 (1956). While the topic has
drawn the attention of several commentators, and captured the attention of some,
see, e.g., Bayne, Noninvestment Value of Control Stock, 45 IND. L.J. 317 (1970);
Bayne, Investment Value of Control Stock, 54 MmN. L. REv. 1265 (1970); Bayne,
The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Definition, 53 MINN. L. 1REV. 485 (1969);
Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Disposition, 57 CAL. L. PEv. 615 (1969);
Bayne, The Sale-of-Control Premium: The Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 47 TFx. L. 1Ev.
215 (1969); Bayne, A Legitimate Transfer of Control: The Weyenberg Shoe-
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ever, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the subsidiary was perceived as a likely merger target by the market, thereby resulting in
a higher market price for the subsidiary than its "true" value.71 As
a consequence, there is a risk in that context that the market would
be unreliably high, and the "fair" price dictated by the Brudney &:
Chirelstein approach would be unfair to the parent corporation's
shareholders.
Finally, there remains a lingering doubt that market valuations
are the proper approximation of the corpus of the trust that Brudney &:Chirelstein assert is being managed by the parent. Perhaps
the most troublesome case is that of the closed-end investment company. Such entities, which typically hold a liquid portfolio of
securities, traditionally sell in the market at a discount from the
per-share value of their securities portfolio.7 2 How then would the
Florsheim Case Study, 18 STAN. L. REv. 438 (1966); Bayne, The Definition of
Corporate Control, 9 ST. Louis U. L.J. 445 (1965); Bayne, The Sale of Corporate
Control, 33 FORDHAm L. REv. 583 (1965); Bayne, A Philosophy of Corporate Control, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 22 (1963), the courts have largely rejected such an
approach except where "special facts" have been found, justifying the conclusion
that the transfer of control worked a particular hardship on minority shareholders
in violation of the fiduciary duty owed them, as in Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co.,
1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969); and Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955). See McDaniel
v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 548 (10th Cir. 1969). One California District Court of
Appeal decision, Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781
(1969) appears to come close to adopting the theory of control as a corporate asset,
but that aspect of the decision is of questionable authority at best in view of the
clear refusal of the California Supreme Court to adopt such a general view in its
subsequent decision in Jones, 1 Cal. 3d at 117, 460 P.2d at 478, 81 Cal. Rptr. at
606. Thus, the concluding comments of Professor Leech in one of the first articles
to deal with the topic thoroughly remain valid: "Thus far, the courts have been
unwilling to require every seller of control to account for his profit; control as such
has not yet attained the status of a 'corporate asset."' Leech, Transactions in
Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 837 (1956).
71 For example, when Bayer Corp. announced that it was mounting a tender
offer for Miles Laboratories, the price of Miles stock jumped approximately 18
points in six weeks. Compare N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 53, co. 3 (Miles
selling at 29,11 when Bayer tender of at least $40 a share announced) with Wall St.
J., Nov. 11, 1977, at 34, col. 5 (Miles selling at 46%). Similarly, the tender battle
between Eaton Corp. and Kennecott Co. over Carborundum Corp. caused Carborundum's price to rise 33 points in seven weeks. Compare Wall St. J., Nov. 1, 1977,
at 46, col. 4 (Carborundum closing at 33 ) with id. Dec. 22, 1977, at 24, col. 2
(Carborundum closing at 66K). Empirical data does not appear to be available
as to the extent to which those, or other corporations, were perceived as potential
take-over targets, or as to the impact of such perceptions on pre-announcement
prices.
72
See, e.g., SEC. PuBLiC Poucy IPimCATiONS OF INvESTmNT CoizPANy
GRoWT 44 H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) indicating that on
June 30, 1966 nine of the ten largest diversified closed-end investment companies
in the United States sold at discounts from net assets per share ranging from 5.6
per cent to 27.8 per cent See generally Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on
Closed-End Mutual Funds: A Study in Valuation, 28 J. FIANcE 515 (1973);
Mendelson, Closed-End Fund Discounts Revisited, 2 FINANCuIL RLv. - (forthcoming, 1978).
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Brudney & Chirelstein analysis apply to a merger of two closed-end
investment companies selling at disproportionate discounts from
their book value? The fiduciary theory on which the analysis is
based suggests that the merger should be at a price which is in
proportion to the value size of the portfolios; the formula which
they derive would compel a merger price based on relative market
prices of the shares.7 3 Although closed-end investment companies
are certainly different from the ordinary, operating corporation, the
clear difference between the trust corpus sense out of which the
theory sprang and the market value context in which the formula
developed raises the question whether the market measurement is
the right one for asserting the fiduciary duty. In the specific context
of closed-end investment companies, the view of the SEC, with the
recent approval of the Supreme Court, is that net asset value, not
market value, is the appropriate benchmark for valuation purposes.74 And although one might posit an exception to the general
theory for the peculiar case of closed-end funds, there is nothing in
the theory that justifies such an exception. More properly, if the
fiduciary duty is accepted, the question of valuing the corpus of the
trust should remain.
Thus, even in the relatively simple context of the stock merger,
when the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis reduces to the convenience
of formula B-3, that analysis may be seen to suffer from severe
deficiencies. The fiduciary notion on which it is based, while providing a useful framework, does not yield any compelling conclusion as to how a fiduciary should behave. Similarly, it is far from
clear that the benefits available in a merger can properly be considered the equivalent of a saving, or an investment opportunity, to
which the supposed trust beneficiaries have equal claims. And
finally, there are three distinct and quite severe impediments in the
transition from the general fiduciary theory to its practical application. First, the approach suggests a precision that is simply not
realistic in these matters. Second, it is likely that market prices are
seldom reliable indicators of the fair value of a controlled subsidiary,
since the market value reflects the entity qua subsidiary, not the
78

Given, for example, fund A with net asset value of $100 per share and

market value of $90 per share, which controls fund B with net asset value of $50

per share and market value of $40 per share, the fiduciary theory, according to
Brudney & Chireistein, would dictate a 2:1 exchange ratio, but the sharing formula
would dictate a 2.25:1 ratio, even though the latter is in theory derived directly
from the former.
See
74 See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977).

generally Note, Fairness and Net Asset Valuation in Mergers Under the Investment
Company Act: Collins v. SEC, 76 COLum. L. REv. 1332 (1976).
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entity by itself. Third, it is not at all clear that the market's measurement of value of the enterprise is the measurement that should
be used for determining the corpus of the trust that the directors
are to be viewed as managing. When the theory is examined in the
more complex context of non-stock mergers, in which the subsidiary's minority shareholders no longer have an ongoing equity interest
in the combined entity, it becomes considerably less useful, as the
section following will demonstrate.
IV.

THE BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN ANALYSIS

As

APPLIED

To NON-STOCK MERGERS

Many, if not most, controlled mergers do not take the form of
stock transactions, but rather involve the issuance of cash or debt
securities in exchange for the minority shareholders' interest in the
subsidiary. In stock transaction mergers, at least it can be said that
the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis suggests an approach which, although not compelling as the single fair approach, is possibly one
fair approach that provides some guidance to corporate planners.
In the non-stock transaction, those qualities evaporate. The Brudney & Chirelstein article does not address the substantial practical
difficulties that are involved in allocating possible synergies in nonstock mergers; the article casually suggests the possibility of some
post-merger distribution of cash.7 5 That suggestion is not sufficient
to dispel the problems of applying the Brudney & Chirelstein
analysis to non-stock transactions.
It is possible, in the stock transaction, that one will naturally
be led to accept the fairness of a merger whose terms are based on
the comparative market values of the merging entities. Although
the process by which the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis arrives at
that conclusion is dubious, the analysis is an inherently satisfying
one, perhaps because it would be a logical starting point for actual
arms' length negotiations, 6 or perhaps because relative market
75 Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 5, at 323.
76 Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the business literature suggests that the
Brudney & Chirelstein formula as applied to stock transactions might yield a lower
price than that for which reasonable parties would negotiate at arms' length. "[I]t
will be very difficult to make the acquisition without offering a premium over the
stock market price." Keidan, How to Establish a Price Range in AcQuisIToN AND
Msmcm NEGOTIATING STRATEGY 105, 114 (M. Strage ed. 1971). See also D. BEAN,
FINANCIAL STRATEGY IN THE AcQuIsIION DECISION 90, 91 (1975). Indeed, one
might question how frequently it will be that the managers of one corporation
would surrender their managerial positions in a merger in which they receive no
more than the present market value of their own stock in the form of shares of the
acquiring corporation, for that is clearly what formula B-3 provides. Perhaps the
answer is that they will do so only when they are convinced that there will be
substantial positive synergy, quite likely of the market synergy type.
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values provide a viscerally satisfying sense of equivalent value, if
the minority shareholders of the subsidiary are to be folded into the
shareholder family of the parent. In the non-stock merger, where
cash or equivalent debt is to be distributed, formula B-1 does not
reduce to formula B-3.7 7 Therefore, if the Brudney &eChirelstein
approach is to be followed, there must be an explicit recognition of
the merger benefit and payment for it. As the following discussion
will show, the Brudney & Chirelstein approach loses whatever attraction it might otherwise have in the context of non-stock mergers.
Consider the following example: P owns 75% of the stock of S.
Pertinent information concerning the earnings and market value of
P and S is as follows:

P
S

Annual
Net
Income
$12,000,000
$ 1,500,000

Recent
Average
Shares
Market
Outstanding *
Price
2,000,000
$48
2,000,000
$15

Market
Value *
$96,000,000
$30,000,000

Including 1,500,000 S shares owned by P. The public market value of S is
therefore $7.5 million.

If the two companies were merged through an exchange of
stock, S's minority shareholders would be entitled to a fair exchange
ratio of .3125 (which equals $15 divided by $48), or 156,250 P
shares, under the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis. Thus, the
minority shareholders of S would have approximately a 7.2 per cent
interest in the combined entity.78 If the market price of P remains
at or above $48 per share following the merger, the minority shareholders' interest in P will have a value the same as or greater than
their interest in S prior to the merger.
Assume further that the post-merger enterprise will have annual
income of $12,875,000; that represents an increase of $500,000 over
the combined pre-merger incomes, since all but $375,000 of S's premerger income was already included in P's income. However, if
P's directors evaluate this situation and expect the market to continue to value P at a price/earnings multiple of 8 after the merger,
7T Essentially, formula B-1 does not reduce to formula B-3, see note 13 supra,

in non-stock mergers because the value of the consideration to be given to the
subsidiary's minority shareholders cannot be expressed in relation to the parent's
stock.
T8 The 7.2 per cent figure is achieved by dividing the 156,250 P shares that
would be issued by the 2,156,250 total P shares outstanding. The same result may
be reached through the more complicated formula B-1.
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they may decide against a stock merger. If P's price/earnings multiple of 8 is not affected by the absorption of S with its price/earnings
multiple of 20, the price of a post-merger share of P will drop to
$47.77, and the combined market value of the entities will drop
from $103.5 million to $103 million. 9 Thus, both P shareholders
and S shareholders will have less, in a market sense, than they had
prior to the merger even though the merger generated a 4.2%,
increase in P's total net income. In such a situation, without knowing whether the additional $500,000 of income is the result of
management synergy or operating synergy, the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis yields more than one solution, and none of those solutions appears to be more compelling than any other.
Brudney & Chirelstein themselves would probably conclude
that the minority shareholders of S are entitled to $7,789,854.80.
That figure is determined by formula B-i, viewing the merger
benefit in this case as $4,000,000, which represents the market's
recognition of the $500,000 of additional annual income to P multiplied by P's price/earnings multiple of 8. Thus, S's minority shareholders would be entitled to their pre-merger value of $7.5 million
plus their proportionate part ($7,500,000 -- ($7,500,000 + $96,000,000)) of the benefit, or $7,789,854.80. It would not be unreasonable, however, for P to argue that S's minority shareholders should
participate not in what did happen in a cash payment context, but
in what would have happened in a stock merger transaction. P's
directors, having been prescient enough to divine the adverse
market consequences of a stock merger, might argue that in a stock
merger the S shareholders would have received 156,250 P shares
with a market value of $47.77 per share, or a total of $7,463,768,
under the Brudney & Chirelstein fairness analysis. Under that
theory, a payment of $7,463,768 for the minority interest in S should
therefore be deemed fair. Admittedly, the total figure is slightly
less than the pre-merger market value of $7,500,000 held by S's shareholders, but the decrease is the result of the negative synergy that
would have been produced by the market. Of course, after a cash
merger P's shareholders would in fact see P's stock move from $48
per share to $51.50 per share,8 0 but that is the result of the pre79 The calculation follows from the assumptions that the merged enterprise will
earn $12,875,000 and will have a price/earnings multiple of 8. Since the total
market value would then be $103 million and 156,250 shares would be issued to the
former S shareholders by following formula B-3, each post-merger share of P would
have a market value of $103,000,000 - 2,156,250 = $47.77.
80 Since the market multiple is assumed to stay at 8, thereby yielding a total
market value of $103 million for P after the merger, the price of P will be $51.50
per share if there are only 2 million shares outstanding after the transaction.
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science of their directors in avoiding the negative market synergism
of the stock merger. After all, if the S shareholders tried to get a
piece of the pie, it would not be there.
Alternatively, S's minority shareholders might reasonably reject
as unfair a payment for their stock that is as high as $7,789,854.80.
It could be argued on their behalf that if their claim for $7,500,000
is recognized as a starting point in a Brudney 8 Chirelstein analysis,
P is paying 20 times the historical earnings of S. Why then should
their fair share of the additional annual earnings of $500,000 that
resulted from the merger be capitalized at P's multiple of 8 rather
than S's multiple of 20? "1 Under this argument, the minority
holders of S would be entitled to their initial $7,500,000 plus the
product of their 7.2 per cent share of the additional income times
their capitalization rate of 20, which yields a total payment of $8.22
million. Even though such an approach would lead to P's paying
out more than the total $4,000,000 market benefit if S constituted
more than 40 per cent of the combined market values of S and P,
the shareholders of S could argue that this result is the price of
buying out companies with a higher multiple than one's own.
Thus, on the same basic assumptions, different notions of what
is meant by "merger benefit" and of how that benefit is quantified
as a present value lead to "fair" payments differing by more than
10 per cent before considering the reasons for the additional income,
the impact of making adjustments to market price that might be
appropriate, or the effect of selecting different periods to measure
market prices. Moreover, the three possibilities suggested above all
used capitalization rates that were suggested by price/earnings multiples, where the price is based on market value.8 2 But in quantifying the merger benefit as a present value, any number of other
discount rates might be suggested for capitalizing the $500,000 income benefit attributable to the merger. The selection of an
Although this sort of analysis may suggest rather remarkably that the market cares
not one whit about how much is paid for the minority interest, it is perhaps fairer
to indicate that the assumptions stated concerning the post-merger income of P
necessarily included lesser assumptions as to the loss of other income opportunities
or the incurring of interest expenses connected with the acquisition.
81 See note 29 supra.
82 Actually, price/earnings multiples that look to historical, or even immediately
estimated, earnings provide a poor substitute for capitalization ratios that should
look to a future stream of earnings. A high price/earnings multiple may suggest
not so much a low percentage discount rate for capitalization as an expectation of
substantial increases in future earnings. But see Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., Inc.,
339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Francis I. duPont
& Co., 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975). However, the present analysis seemed complicated enough without delving extensively into such matters.
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appropriate discount rate is as important and difficult as any other
calculation in this quest for fairness.8 3
Even if the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis did lead to one
"fair" solution, however, it would be misapplied here, because it
is fundamental that the stock market does not merely yield varying
rewards; it yields rewards in some proportion to risks taken." An
element of fairness inherent in the application of the Brudney &Chirelstein analysis to the stock merger case may be that it gives the
minority shareholders a proportionate interest in the benefits and
risks of the merger. If the synergism as viewed by the market is
negative, the minority shareholders will participate in that, too.83
If the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis were equally applied to cash
mergers, the minority shareholders would bear no risk. Whether
the share of the synergy is paid contemporaneously with the merger
-in which case the frailty of estimates provides additional basis for
dissatisfaction-or after the merger, there is little chance that the
minority shareholders of S will be persuaded or compelled to reimburse P proportionately if the combined enterprise income does not
increase to the extent expected, or even declines."6 When the S
shareholders are removed from the risk of stock ownership by a cash
merger, their entitlement to a participation in potential future
rewards becomes extremely doubtful.
V. CONCLUSION

It is with some regret that this Article is written. At least in
stock mergers, the Brudney & Chirelstein approach yielded an ascertainable, satisfying and simple solution. But the fiduciary duty
posited by Brudney &:Chirelstein has no grounding in actual law
or theory. Their notion of a right to share in merger benefit is
insufficiently considered and their reliance on market prices is questionable. In the context of non-stock mergers the advantages of
certainty and simplicity are lost, and the intrinsic appeal of the
analysis disappears. Thus, the value of the Brudney & Chirelstein
approach may lie more in what it has provoked than in the solution
it proposed-but the value of provocation is not inconsiderable. The
83
See, e.g., Blum & Katz, Depreciation and Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. Cmr.
L. REv. 236 (1965).

84 See, e.g., Malkiel, supra note 65, at 176-82, 190-93.

S5 Under the "give-get" approach to a stock merger the minority shareholders
also participate in market risks, since what they receive should properly be meas-

ured as of the date of receipt.
86 In theory, S's shareholders could be paid by a note with a provision for
offset if post-merger earnings failed to equal combined pre-merger earnings. Much
is possible in theory.
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conclusion of this Article is obviously that we cannot easily avoid
the old, traditional approaches-the examination and weighing of
historical and appraised book value and market value, the calculation of the present value of anticipated earnings, and the like 87
-in the quest for valuation. But that does not render the conceptual framework suggested by Brudney & Chirelstein valueless, for
the analysis of fairness may often be aided by recognition of the fact
that the directors of the parent have a conflict in their fiduciary
duties to both the minority shareholders of the subsidiary and the
public shareholders of the parent. In that framework, it becomes
clear, inter alia, that to give the minority shareholders of the subsidiary more is not necessarily to make the merger fairer; for both
groups of public shareholders are entitled to the elusive fairness.
While a reasonable case might sometimes be made that the parent
created the conflicting allegiance (such as when an interest in a
wholly-owned subsidiary was sold publicly) and should therefore
suffer the consequences of its existence, the validity of that argument
will depend upon the history of the particular case, and the argument will often be unavailable. In many cases the conflicting
allegiances will have arisen in a manner such that the parent-and
its public shareholders-can in no way be charged with fault for
having allowed the situation to develop.
Having challenged the simple approach of the Brudney & Chirelstein analysis, it is perhaps incumbent upon the author to provide
some guidance to the courts. Three suggestions may be useful.
First, recognition must be given to the rights of all parties; there is,
after all, no free lunch. Second, notwithstanding that the search
should be for total fairness, the imprecision inherent in such an
analysis must be accepted: fairness must be viewed as some acceptable range, not as a precise amount. And finally, whatever standards may evolve, they must be based upon information available
prior to the merger. For while it may be useful to help courts in
post-merger analyses, it is far more beneficial to help corporate
planners in establishing a fair price in the first instance.
87 See generally, B. GnRAAm, D. DoDD

405-79 (4th ed. 1962).

& S. ComE,

SEcuRIT

ANALySiS

The SEC's proposed rule to regulate fairness in controlled

mergers, see text accompanying notes 8-11 supra, seems implicitly to reject the
Brudney & Chirelstein approach, since fairness of price is to be evaluated "in light

of such factors as, for example, current market prices, historical market prices, net
book value, going-concern value, liquidation value, previous purchases . . . and ary
report, opinion or appraisal .... .. " 42 Fed. Reg. 60, 101 (1977).
However,

those factors are only to be considered, and the rule is, at this stage, merely a
proposal.

If such a proposal is adopted, it would appear likely that questions of

fairness to come before the courts will increase, and greater stress will therefore be
placed upon the methodology of evaluating that rather abstract concept.

